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Computational constraints on compositional interpretation: refocusing the 
debate on language universals 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: We argue that the debate on language universals should be directed away 
from the discussion as to whether typological diversity is or is not an argument 
against the existence of language universals.  Instead, given our growing awareness of 
the fact that the neural mechanisms underlying language use are the same as those 
underlying other cognitive functions in both humans and mammals, the central 
question for cognitive neuroscientists and linguists is what neural mechanisms can 
facilitate compositional interactions, and how the range of grammatical structures and 
the ability to use language creatively emerges from a much narrower range of neural 
mechanisms. We suggest two complementary methods for investigating these issues, 
one more linguistically oriented and one more computationally oriented, and present 
preliminary results from investigations concerning the expression of the mass-count 
distinction crosslinguistically, using both methodologies. These results suggest that 
universality in language might express itself at the deeper level of the computational 
operations involved in the processing of language, rather than in the results of those 
computations.  
Keywords: linguistic universals, compositionality, neural computation, mass-count 
distinction, information measures 
 
1.  The vicious circle of unanalysed data 
Evans and Levinson‟s (2009) paper makes the important point that there is immense 
structural diversity in terms of syntax, phonology and morphology in the world‟s 
languages.  Freidin (2009) and Pesetsky (2009) in their commentaries in BBS make 
the equally important point that taking structural differences at face value may miss 
underlying structural similarities.  This reflects the way that the debate over universals 
is overshadowed by the tendency for “universalists” to propose universals, typologists 
to produce counterexamples to refute them, and universalists then to reject the 
counterexamples as “unanalysed data”. Since many of the world‟s 6000-8000 
languages are undocumented or unanalysed, and each of them takes decades, if not a 
lifetime, to study thoroughly,  the chances of all “unanalysed data” turning into 
analysed data are minimal, and there is no way out of the circle of the debate with the 
rules set as above. 
 
 
2.  A neural computation oriented approach to the issue of language universals 
 
Basic observations in comparative neuroscience suggest a way to reorient the 
discussion on universals.  Evidence accumulated over the past century, but little 
noticed by linguists, indicates that there is no dedicated neuronal machinery to 
subserve complex cognitive capacities, least of all machinery specialized for 
language.  Our abilities to learn, produce and interpret language are supported by the 
same neural mechanisms, at the cortical microcircuitry level, as any other cognitive 
function, including those (most) that we share with other mammals. But while 
something is known about the neural mechanisms underlying, for example, visual and 
auditory processes, we know next to nothing about how the nervous system processes 
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information about the relation between sounds and symbols and how complex 
meanings are represented compositionally in the brain. We can infer the elementary 
cortical transactions to be the same as in better understood functions, but how they 
sum up to produce the faculty of language, and why they should do so only in the 
human species, remains unclear.  The mystery may stem precisely from the nature of 
language as an emergent property, its being more than the sum of its parts, arising, 
that is, by the system-level combination of elementary cortical operations. From such 
a perspective, the central question for cognitive neuroscientists is what neural 
mechanisms can facilitate compositional interactions, and how the range of 
grammatical structures emerges from a much narrower range of neural mechanisms.   
Further, what is the nature of the plasticity which allows children to acquire a native-
speaker linguistic competence in a finite time;  that is, how do children learn to 
manipulate a finite set of symbols in such way that they can produce and interpret an 
infinite number of novel strings and thus convey and comprehend new information  
(Chomsky 1965, 1981). Evans and Levinson‟s (2009) paper does not (as they 
explicitly state) say anything about what has become known as “the logical problem 
of language acquisition”. 
 
 
3. Compositionality at the level of syntax/semantic/conceptual representation 
 
From the perspective just described, it seems to us that universal properties of 
language are to be found precisely among those characteristics which Evans and 
Levinson (following Greenberg et al. 1963) discount as features that are universal by 
definition (page 20), including „discreteness, arbitrariness, productivity‟ and the 
ability to combine arbitrary phonological symbols into meaningful elements. These 
features may well be implicit in the conventional definition of what a language is, but 
they are not trivially reducible to neuronal operations.  If they were, how come 
animals with a nearly identical nervous system do not speak?  The property of 
language which appears to pose the most serious computational challenge to the 
nervous system is in fact missing from Evans and Levinson‟s list: it is what we may 
call hierarchical compositionality at the level of the syntactic/semantic interface. It is 
the property of combining abstract elements, each associated with a meaning, into a 
complex symbol whose meaning is dependent on the meaning of its parts, and then 
combining these complex symbols into more complex entities whose meaning is yet 
again predictable on the basis of its immediate constituents. As far as we can see, 
assigning meaning to sentences in this way is a feature of all languages, and even if a 
language displays no evidence of syntactic constituent structure and is truly non-
configurational, semantic construal requires combinatorics with respect to meaning. 
Hierarchical compositionality of this kind is a “universal by definition”; it is a 
property which may well set aside language and language manipulation from a range 
of other cognitive capacities. This is in essence the problem of recursion at a more 
abstract (and pre-linguistic) level, and while there may be languages which do not 
involve sentence embedding and thus do not involve that peculiar type of recursion, it 
seems that all languages require some form of compositionality in this general sense. 
Even languages cited like Straits Salish (Jelinek 1995), analysed as consisting of n-
place categorially neutral predicates which can combine with subject and object clitics 
and with arguments derived from predicates via a form of relative clause construction, 
use hierarchical compositionality and limited recursion as the basis of their grammar.  
   
4. Compositionality can only be analysed in sufficiently large systems  
A limit on many approaches that have been proposed may be their relying on toy 
cases of extremely reduced complexity, and on the assumption that any neural 
mechanism can be later scaled up to address real-life tasks. Reducing the complexity 
of natural behavior to laboratory manageability is common practice in cognitive 
science, but it may prevent us from revealing properties that emerge only above a 
critical size or complexity, out of a phase transition (a sudden qualitative change in 
behaviour at the slight quantitative change of a parameter describing the system). 
Compositionality may be related to cortical latching dynamics, the ability of a large 
cortical network to hop indefinitely from state to state, spontaneously, when its 
activity is not clamped by an incoming external input. Latching dynamics indeed 
appears to emerge only beyond a phase transition (Treves, 2005). Yet, the neural 
underpinnings of compositionality remain an object of rarefied speculation.  In 
contrast, the range of linguistic solutions that have evolved in order to compose 
meaningful utterances is truly impressive, as the target article illustrates, but simply 
observing clusters of solutions, the attractors that Evans and Levinson refer to (in a 
wider sense, cp. Treves, 2005), does not advance our understanding of the 
computational question, how can compositional structures be processed at the 
neuronal level.  Various exciting proposals have been put forward (Pulvermüller 
2002; van der Velde & de Kamps, 2006; Gayler, 2003, 2006; Eliasmith and Thagard, 
2001; Hashimoto, 2008), often as neuronal mechanisms for identifying syntactic 
structure, but they do not yet satisfactorily solve the problem of matching semantic 
with syntactic representations, and thus leave open the question of how to match 
meanings with neural representations. Again, the core issue is what neural 
mechanisms can facilitate compositional interpretation, and it appears necessary to 
address it using model systems of sufficient complexity, where solutions can be 
imagined to scale up to real-life problems. What is the mapping between syntactic 
structure (i.e. grammatical expressibility) and semantic or conceptual structure? A 
further question is how the grammaticalisation of real-world conceptual distinctions 
such as singularity/plurality, mass/count, and distinctions in gender, takes place. 
These distinctions are at their root prelinguistic and thus universally available, but 
their grammaticalisation emerges differently across languages, and raises the question 
of exactly how the language/world mapping is neurally encoded, where the variation 
comes in and just how wide the variation can be.  
There seem to us to be two complementary ways to address the issue of the 
possibility of common structure underlying crosslinguistic variation. Assume that 
different grammatical structures can be seen as reflecting different solutions to the 
problem of the neural mechanics of composing elements of meaning into „bigger‟ 
chunks of  meaning. The more linguistically oriented approach is to identify 
crosslinguistically a range of grammatical solutions to the compositional problem 
posed by the mapping of a particular semantic construction or operation into a 
syntactic structure, and to try and identify what computational properties these 
solutions have in common. If there are neurally-based computational constraints on 
semantic composition, semantic operations underlying parallel grammatical 
phenomena may show similar properties, even if the grammatical expression of these 
computational processes is very different from language to language. These 
similarities would give insight into how the language computation actually works. 
The more computationally oriented way is to identify biologically plausible ways of 
computing the information necessary for linguistic performance, and to construct 
models of how these computational mechanisms could interact with naturally 
available data, both in situations of acquisition and of „normal language use‟. If neural 
mechanisms prove to constrain grammatical devices, then this may lead to evidence 
for universals of language in a cognitively plausible way. 
 
 
5. Examples 
 
In this section we present an example of each of the proposed methodologies for 
approaching the issue of language universals. Together, they address the grammatical 
realisation of the contrast between counting and measuring: 
 
(i) grammatical expression of counting vs measuring: 
Semantic research (Carlson 1977, Chierchia 1998, Landman 2004, Rothstein 2009) 
has clarified that there are two distinct grammatical operations involving number.  
The one is counting, putting individuable entities in one-to-one correspondence with 
the natural numbers as in three girls, and the other is measuring, ascribing a value on 
a dimensional scale to a quantity. In languages with a distinction between mass and 
count nouns, counting only requires a number and a sortal nominal. Depending on the 
theory, the sortal either presupposes the atomicity of the entities in its denotation 
(Landman 2004, Chierchia 1998) or grammatically encodes it (Krifka 1989, Rothstein 
2010).  Measuring requires a number and a unit or measurement as in two kilos of 
flour, 200 kilos of furniture and ignores any atomic structure that there may be in the 
denotation of the predicate. Grammatically, in a language with a mass/count 
distinction, counting is an operation which applies to count nouns, and measuring is 
an operation which applies to mass nouns. In complex nominals, the distinction 
between counting and measuring phrases is normally blurred. Two glasses of water 
and three boxes of books are ambiguous between a counting reading illustrated in (1), 
in which the containers, filled with water or books, are physically present, and a 
measuring reading in (2), in which the nominals denote water to the quantity of two 
glasses and books to the quantity of two boxes: 
 
(1)    a. She brought two glasses of water for our guests 
 b. The post office complained about the weight of three boxes of books. 
 
(2)   a. Add two glasses of water to the soup!   
       b. Three boxes of books won‟t fit on the shelf. 
 
Rothstein (2009) shows that classifier expressions expressing measuring and counting 
have different syntactic analyses in English and Modern Hebrew. In counting 
expressions, the classifier is analysed as a head taking a complement and the 
complement is a referential expression.  The numeral directly modifies the complex 
NP in a structure directly parallel to the simple expression three girls. 
 
(3) a.   [three  [girls]] 
     b.   [three  [boxes  of books]] 
 
In measuring expressions, the classifier combines first with the numeral to form a 
complex predicate which modifies the complement NP, itself analysed as a predicate 
nominal.  This is analogous to the structure proposed for the explicit measure 
expressions in (4b). 
 (4) a.  [three boxes] of  books  
         b.  [three kilos] of flour 
 
This contrast is made explicit in Modern Hebrew which has two standard complex 
nominal forms, an absolute form (5a) where the nominal head is in root form and 
takes a PP complement comprised of P and a referential nominal (allowing 
modification, quantifiers and etc). The second (5b) is a construct state nominal, in 
which the head is reduced phonologically, and the complement is a bare NP (Borer 
1999, 2009) 
  
(5)  a.   šaloš kosot  šel  mayim 
             three cups    of water  
 
       b.   šaloš kosot mayim 
         three cups  water 
 
(5a) has only the counting interpretation, while (5b) is ambiguous between counting 
and measure reading.  Rothstein (2009) argues that this is because (5b) is an 
underspecified syntactic structure, which allows analysis analogous either to (3) or to 
(4), while (5a) can only have the structure in (3).  Definite numerical construct states 
must be analysed for independent reasons as in (6) and do not allow numeral and 
classifier to form a constituent.  In these constructions, predictably, the measure 
reading is impossible. 
 
(6) [šlošet] [bakbukey  ha-mayim] 
         three     bottles         DEF-water      
         "The three bottles of water" (definite: multiple embedded construct state forms) 
    
In constructions analogous to (6), where the classifier is a measure expression such as 
kilo, the compositional demands of the syntax and semantics conflict: definite 
construct state syntax requires the classifier to be construed as a constituent with the 
complement, but the semantics of the measure head kilo requires the classifier to be 
construed as a constituent together with the number.  The result is that the 
computation is blocked and the construction is ungrammatical.  There is no way to 
express directly in Hebrew e.g. the three litres of wine that I drank/the three kilos of 
flour that I ordered although the indefinite is perfectly acceptable.  This is evidence 
that the grammatical expression of measuring involves number and classifier to be 
construed as a complex predicate, while in counting constructions, the head is 
individuating.  Preliminary investigations into Russian and French suggest that these 
languages also show grammatical contrasts between counting and measuring 
constructions, although the grammatical indications differ in each case. In languages 
without a mass/count contrast, classifier systems are used to count as well as to 
measure as in (7) (from Mandarin): 
 
(7)  a. sān   gè   rén 
              three CL man 
              “three men” 
 
       b.  liăng  gōngjīn  píngguŏ 
               two    kilo      apple 
              “two kilos apple” 
 
However, preliminary results (XP Li, in progress) shows that in counting contexts 
such as (8a), Cl + N  are construed as a constituent, while in measuring expressions 
such as (8b) Num + Cl are construed as a constituent, indicating syntactic contrasts 
between counting and measuring expressions which parallel the results for English 
and Hebrew.  
 These results indicate some common representation of the measuring and 
counting computations at the level of modifier/modificand relations, although the 
grammatical expression of the relation may differ greatly from language to language 
depending on the morphosyntactic structure of the language.  This suggests that 
crosslinguistic commonalities in counting and measuring systems will be found at a 
more abstract level of computational representation than linguists usually use to 
describe morphosyntactic representations.  It points towards a level at which neural 
computations and semantic compositions might be matched, and suggests a level of 
abstraction at which we should look to model the neural representation of 
grammatical structure. 
 
(ii) Crosslinguistic diversity of the mass count distinction 
Crosslinguistic variation in the expression of the mass/count distinction has been a 
puzzle for cognitive science and linguistics. On the one hand, there is a clear link 
between cognitive mechanisms of individuation and linguistic mechanisms for 
counting.  Count nouns naturally denote individuable or bounded entities with stable 
spatial properties across time (e.g. cat, boy, table, book), while mass nouns are 
associated with substances which take their spatial dimensions from containers (e.g. 
water, mud), or whose physical boundedness varies over time or depends on the 
artefact constructed from it (e.g. wood, gold). (See also Soja, Carey and Spelke 1991, 
Prasada, Ferenz and Haskell 1994, Gathercole 1986). On the other hand, there is no 
direct association between count terms and individuable objects or mass terms and 
substances, and it has always been claimed that there is wide crosslinguistic variation 
in how the mass/count distinction is played out grammatically. This raises two 
questions: 
(i) how different is the expression of the distinction crosslinguistically, i.e. to what 
degree is the mass/count distinction an arbitrary grammaticalisation, rather than a 
straightforward expression of a conceptual distinction 
(ii) how is the grammatical distinction derived computationally from a conceptual 
distinction (if it is not a direct reflection of it). 
We hypothesize that, in languages that do make a distinction between mass 
and count nouns, the exact way in which a noun should be used syntactically (whether 
it can be pluralized, whether it admits exact or indeterminate quantifiers, etc.) should 
be related to basic semantic features of the noun – with some variability across 
languages arising from differences among the features that determine syntactic usage 
– apart from a few exceptions, borrowings from other languages and other special 
cases.  Of course, in no language do we expect the mass/count distinction to be simply 
a distinction between two groups of nouns, those that are countable and those that are 
not. Still, it should be possible to specify the correct syntactic usage of each noun via 
a sufficient number QL of binary questions, which can be designed in each language L 
to lay out how individual nouns behave in the mass/count domain. If we represent the 
yes/no answers for a particular noun as components of a vector, each noun is 
associated with a binary usage vector with QL [0,1] components. Distinct usage 
vectors define equivalence classes, that is, nouns associated with the same vector 
behave identically in language L, and mass/count syntactic categories in that language 
are described as a partition into a maximum of 2
Q
L (2 to the power QL) classes. A 
neurally plausible mechanism for using a particular language correctly, then, posits 
that the usage vector for each noun can be derived from a universal semantic vector 
describing the features of the noun, via a simple feedforward network with language-
specific synaptic weights.  
For this hypothesis to be plausible, the nouns in different languages should 
cluster into usage vectors in roughly similar ways. We naively expect 2 main classes 
that largely correspond across languages, the class of the prototypical mass nouns and 
that of the prototypical count nouns – the sharp edges of the continuum – and several 
smaller classes that would show considerable variability from language to language. 
Further, assuming prototypical mass and count nouns to occur with roughly similar 
frequency in our sample, we expect about one bit of entropy, in the partition of nouns 
across usage classes, to reflect the basic mass/count distinction, and to be shared 
across languages; and additional fractions of a bit to reflect smaller usage classes 
around the middle of the continuum, and to be shared only among syntactically 
related languages. This is simply a quantitative way to state that most of the 
mass/count-related syntax should just express common semantic cognition, with some 
additional language specific “decorations”. If this naïve hypothesis were to be correct, 
different weighting of possibly 10-20 semantic features might account for language 
specific instantiations of the mass/count distinction. Then acquiring those weights, 
e.g. by associative learning, would be equivalent to acquiring the correct mass/count 
usage in a given language, starting from an effectively universal neuronal 
representation of the meaning of nouns encoded as distributed cell assemblies, 
articulated in terms of their features.  
Our empirical assessment of this naïve hypothesis has led us to discard it. In 
work that will be described in a separate publication (Kulkarni, Rothstein and Treves, 
in preparation), we find that the correspondence among the mass/count syntactic 
usage vectors across a sample of 5 languages is limited – when focusing on pairwise 
correspondence. When considering triplets of language the correspondence, as 
measured by 3-way Shannon information, (a somewhat technical measure of the 
similarity of the classes across three languages) it is virtually null: the 
grammaticalisation of the mass/count distinction, when analysed statistically, appears 
to diverge, even among historically-related languages.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We see that two complementary approaches, one linguistic the other statistical, 
apparently lead to somewhat incongruent assessments of the universality of a specific 
language feature, the mass/count distinction. However, they both indicate that 
universality in language might express itself at the deeper level of the computational 
operations involved in the processing of language, rather than in the results of those 
computations. What the two approaches also have in common is their pointing to the 
need to go beyond the sterile philosophical debate about whether a particular item 
should be regarded as universal or not, framed in the binaries argumentation based on 
examples and counterfactuals, and to start assessing quantitatively the degree of 
universality of specific aspects of language, doing justice to the infinite levels of 
complexity of this fascinating cognitive capacity. 
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